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Appellant and Petitioner, Neil R. Mitchell (NXMr. 
Mitchell7') , hereby petitions this Court for rehearing of the 
above-captioned appeal. In support of this Petition, Mr. 
Mitchell asserts the following points of law and fact which this 
Court overlooked or misapprehended in issuing its Opinion filed 
on May 16, 1996 (the "Opinion"). 
POINT I 
THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS AS TO THE ESTATE 
CHECKING ACCOUNT IS FLAWED. 
Both this Court and the trial court acknowledge that by 
failing to fund the Bypass Trust, as required by Grant Sims' 
Will, Marjorie Sims breached her fiduciary duty as personal 
representative under Grant's Will. In exonerating her and her 
Estate from that breach, this Court ignored and misperceived the 
law and the facts as cited in Mr. Mitchell's briefs, in 
interpreting the relevant testamentary language and its effect. 
First, in the Opinion, this Court paraphrases the operative 
provision of the Will and, by so doing, changes the meaning of 
the provision. With the language and the meaning altered, the 
Court's analysis of the passage is incorrect. The provision in 
question states as follows: 
1For the convenience of the Court, the abbreviations 
utilized in this Petition for Rehearing correspond directly to 
those utilized in Appellant's briefs in this appeal. 
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[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs. Sims] 
without any conditions, all of the income of said 
trust. The trustees shall also distribute as much of 
the principal as is necessary for her proper health, 
support, and maintenance and to maintain her in the 
standard of living that she enjoyed during my lifetime. 
After setting forth the full language of the provision, this 
Court then paraphrases it as follows: 
The language of the Will clearly states that Mrs. Sims 
shall receive distributions from the principal of Mr. 
Sims' Estate "necessary for her proper health, support, 
and maintenance." 
Significantly, the analysis omits the words "as is," which modify 
and qualify the word "necessary." This omission changes the 
phrase's meaning entirely and transforms it into an unqualified 
requirement for the trustee to distribute principal to Marge. 
This paraphrasing fits the Court's ultimate conclusion that Marge 
did no wrong, but does not square with the plain language of the 
Will. 
In the next sentence of the Opinion, the Court again alters 
the language of the Will. In responding to Mr. Mitchell's 
argument that the phrase "as is necessary" requires the Trustee 
to consider the beneficiary's independent resources before 
distributing principal, the Court states: 
We need not address that question because Mr. Sims' 
Will does not merely authorize the invasion of the 
principal for the "necessities of life."... Instead, 
Mr. Sims' Will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have 
access to the principal "to maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in 
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the standard of living that she enjoyed during my 
lifetime." 
Again, the Court omits the phrase "as is necessary" and glosses 
over the issue. The Court's rendition of the provision makes it 
appear that Marge was to have unfettered access to the principal 
of the Trust, which is not what is dictated by the plain language 
of the Will. Again, the alteration fits the Court's conclusion, 
but not the reality of the Will. 
Further, by omitting the "as is necessary" language from the 
quote and focusing, instead, on the "shall distribute" language, 
the Court expressly avoided addressing the core issue of the 
meaning of the phrase "as is necessary" in this context. The 
Court's avoidance'of this analytical responsibility is improper, 
particularly in an opinion designated for publication on an issue 
never before addressed by the appellate courts of Utah. 
This issue was squarely before the Court. Ms. Wood cited 
cases analyzing similar clauses, and Mr. Mitchell cited several 
cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that if a will 
or trust contains an "as is necessary" clause, the trustee is 
required or authorized to consider the beneficiary's independent 
resources before invading principal. See Appellant's Reply 
2Contrary to the Court's analysis, Mr. Mitchell did not 
argue solely that Marge had to exhaust her resources before a 
distribution of principal could be made. He also argued, based 
on additional cases in his Reply brief, that the "as is 
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Brief, at pp. 8-14. In fact, on pages 12 and 13 of his Reply 
Brief, Mr. Mitchell cites three cases that hold that even if a 
will states that the trustee "shall distribute" principal 
payments, if the will also contains language that such 
distributions are only to be made "as is necessary," the trustee 
must examine the beneficiary's independent assets before making 
such a distribution. See In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d 718, " 
720 (N.Y. 1969); Hull v. Holloway, 20 A. 445, 447 (Conn. 1889); 
Stemple v. Middletown Trust Co., 15 A.2d 305, 307 (Conn. 1940). 
Mr. Mitchell's well-supported position, therefore, makes 
meaningless the distinction in the Opinion that because the Will 
says "shall distribute" the Court need not address the meaning of 
"as is necessary." 
Mr. Mitchell also cites cases such as Security People's 
Trust Company v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965), 
that hold that a trustee of a testamentary trust has a fiduciary 
responsibility to the remainder beneficiaries to ensure that 
invasions of principal are proper. In this case, had the Trust 
been funded, Mr. Mitchell, as a co-trustee, would have owed the 
same fiduciary duty to the Remainder Beneficiaries. 
necessary" language would have entitled him, as one of the co-
trustees of the Trust, to consider Marge's vast personal wealth 
before invading the principal. The Court failed to even 
recognize this important aspect of Mr. Mitchell's position. 
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This Court failed to address these arguments or attempt to 
distinguish the cited case law. Even though the Court chose not 
to address the question of the meaning of the phrase "as is 
necessary/' the issue was properly before the Court, and the 
Court's failure to analyze it undermines the integrity and value 
of the Opinion. 
The second major flaw in the Court's analysis of Marge's 
breach is its failure to examine or consider Grant's intent in 
interpreting the operative provision. All of the cases cited by 
both sides in this matter hold that the court must first 
ascertain the intent of the testator before determining whether 
the phrase NXas is necessary" requires examination of the 
beneficiary's independent resources. 
An excellent discussion of the necessity and method of 
determining testamentary intent in analyzing such phrases is 
found in the case cited by Ms. Wood, First National Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224 (Wyo. 1966). In that case, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed a testamentary provision similar 
to the one in the present case which authorized invasion of 
principal Mas in [the trustee's] judgment may be necessary" for 
the beneficiary's proper care and support. The Wyoming Supreme 
Court made the following salient observations: 
The great volume of litigation prompted by clauses 
similar to the one here and the struggle courts have 
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with those clauses in order to arrive at the intention 
of the grantor demonstrate the ambiguity. Usually, the 
divergence in results reached can be attributed in a 
large measure to the circumstances surrounding the 
creation of the trust. . . . Consequently, we think 
there is merit and defend its contention that competent 
evidence tending to show surrounding circumstances was 
admissible and was entitled to consideration. . . . 
Because of the variance in the language of the clause being 
interpreted and the differing surrounding circumstances 
present in each case, reliance on precedents has its 
limitations. Seldom is it possible neatly to package an 
invasion clause into a particular class and say that it is 
controlled by some categorical general rule. . . . 
As we have heretofore indicated, it is the intention of the 
grantor that must govern. That is to be ascertained, if 
possible, from the context of the trust instrument as a 
whole. Every word is to be given effect if that can be done 
without defeating the general purpose of the trust. If the 
intention of the grantor does not readily appear from the 
instrument, then the language used is to be read in light of 
the surrounding circumstances. . . . A narrow and 
unreasonable construction that would defeat the purpose 
intended by the grantor will not be adopted. Once 
ascertained, the intention must govern, provided that the 
result reached is not contrary to law. 
Id. at 228-29 (citation omitted). The court must, therefore, 
determine the testator's intent by looking first to the language 
of the will and then to surrounding circumstances. The Finkbiner 
court applied this doctrine to the surrounding circumstances of 
that case and determined that the grantor intended the trust to 
benefit his spouse without regard to the spouse's independent 
resources. 
The other two cases relied upon by Ms. Wood are correctly 
decided under these same principles. In In re Estate of 
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Lindqren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1984), the beneficiary was in a 
nursing home and was represented by a conservator. The 
conservator had made payments out of her own pocket to support 
the beneficiary. Although need had not been established in the 
eyes of the trustee, the principal disbursements were necessary 
to reimburse the conservator and maintain the beneficiary in the 
nursing home. The motivation to establish the trust was to 
benefit the spouse but not to give her unfettered access to the 
principal because of her mental and physical condition. 
In Godfrey v. Chandley, 811 P.2d 1248 (Can. 1991), both the 
trustee and the beneficiary had adequate wealth. However, the 
terms of the trust are dramatically different from those in the 
present case. The trust forbade the trustee to invade the 
principal. Only the income of the trust was subject to "as is 
necessary" restrictions. The purpose of the trust was clearly 
set forth in the will, and was to support the spouse. The court 
attempted first to ascertain the intent of the grantor. 
In both Lindgren and Godfrey, the courts looked to the 
circumstances surrounding the wills and determined the testator's 
intent. The wills contained provisions similar to the one in 
Grant's Will, and the courts, like the Finkbiner court, found the 
generic provisions to be ambiguous enough to warrant resort to 
extrinsic evidence for interpretative guidance. 
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Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950), relied upon 
by Mr. Mitchell, was also decided using the same principles. 
There, however, the surrounding circumstances demonstrated the 
testator's intent that the trustee examine the beneficiary's 
independent resources before invading the principal of the trust. 
Thus, all of the cases cited by both sides were decided in 
accordance with Mr. Mitchell's position. Mr. Mitchell would, 
therefore, request that this Court reexamine this appeal to apply 
the Finkbiner rules to consider the circumstances and facts 
surrounding the creation of the Will. By so doing, this Court 
will conclude that Grant intended not only to benefit Marge, but 
also to preserve the bulk of his Estate for the Remainder 
Beneficiaries. 
The form of the Will, on its face, as well as those facts in 
the record, support Mr. Mitchell's position but were completely 
ignored by this Court in drafting the Opinion. For example, 
Marge had abundant assets of her own, and the Trust was 
established with two co-trustees in order to safeguard the 
principal. The Court failed to address either of these facts, or 
those additional facts set forth in Mr. Mitchell's Reply Brief at 
pages 15 through 17, which demonstrate Grant's intent. 
Further, other facts and circumstances surrounding the 
creation of the Will which are not in the record evidence Grant's 
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intent that most of the Estate be passed along to Mr. Mitchell 
and his family, as Remainder Beneficiaries. For example, Grant 
made substantial gifts of money and personal property to Mr. 
Mitchell and his family prior to his death. Mr. Mitchell and 
Grant enjoyed essentially a father/son relationship during the 
last years of Grant's life. Accordingly, Grant had genuine 
affection for Mr. Mitchell and his family and desired to benefit 
them through his Will. 
Mr. Mitchell moved the trial court for summary judgment 
based on the undisputed fact, which this Court has acknowledged, 
that Marge breached her fiduciary duty in failing to fund the 
Trust. In hindsight, Mr. Mitchell now realizes that Grant's true 
intent can only be fully ascertained in a plenary evidentiary 
proceeding, rather than in summary fashion. He, therefore, 
requests that this Court rehear this appeal in order to remand it 
to the Trial Court in order to prevent injustice and avoid 
creating precedent without full factual development. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT'S AWARD OF $2,875.40 IS IMPROPER 
This Court, in upholding the Trial Court's award of 
$2,875.40 to Marge's estate, has allowed her estate to be 
reimbursed twice for that amount. This is an error for three 
10 
reasons. First, even under Appellee's position, Marge was not 
entitled to take income from the Estate if she was taking 
principal to pay for her necessary living expenses. The Will, 
taken as a whole and in light of the surrounding circumstances 
and trust law, did not entitle Marge to the income from the 
Estate in addition to principal. 
Mr. Sims declared in his will that: 
[tjhe Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs. Sims] 
without any conditions, ail of the income of said 
trust. 
The words "without any conditions" are solely meant to place 
no limitation on the distribution of income in the event the 
income exceeds the amount necessary for her living expenses. A 
fundamental rule of trusts requires the trustees to first 
distribute the trust income to the beneficiary and then, and only 
then, to distribute so much of the principal to cover any 
deficiency in the case where the income is not sufficient. 
Assuming the income of the Estate had been sufficient for 
Marge's living expenses, the trustees would have been forbidden 
from invading the principal. 
It is undisputed that Marge withdrew $96,642.55 from the 
Estate for her living expenses. This is all that she was 
entitled to under Appellee's theory of the case. Appellee stated 
in the Trial Court that "Grant's intention was to provide his 
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wife with the most discretionary use of his money possible by law 
. . . [emphasis added]." 
Appellee has never maintained that Mrs. Sims was entitled to 
the Estate income and, in addition, her living expenses except in 
the context of this offset to Appellant's claim. 
Second, the figure of $2,875.40 awarded by the Court and 
labeled by the Appellee "interest" is not interest on the 
certificate of deposit appropriated by Marge. The figure has the 
following history. Grant's Estate filed a claim against Marge's 
estate on May 8, 1993. Part of that claim was for a cash 
deficiency of $52,866.71. It was made up of seven specific 
adjustment items based on an accounting by the accounting firm of 
Grant Thornton. Some were positive, some were negative. One 
item was moved subsequently to a post Marge's death 
reconciliation bringing the total claim to $52,875.40. The major 
item on the reconciliation is the $50,000.00 certificate of 
deposit. Ms. Wood merely deducted $50,000.00 from the figure and 
labeled the difference, $2,875.00, "interest." The figure does 
not represent interest or income of Grant's Estate. There is no 
support in the record for the proposition that this figure 
represents interest. It is simply a sum of money for which Marge 
failed to account. 
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One of the six items in the $52,875.40 reconciliation shows 
that Marge's estate suffered a cash deficiency in gross income of 
$2,652.00 for 1992 which is the total gross income earned of 
$13,094.77, less the gross income actually deposited by Marge in 
the bank account of $10,438.27. After this disclosure, Appellee, 
Ms. Wood, did not make a claim for income of the Estate or ask 
for an accounting of total Estate income for the entire period 
between Grant's death and Marge's death. This implies she did 
not believe the Will gave Marge the income for herself and, in 
addition, the principal for her living expenses. The amount of 
$2,875.40 should be returned to Grant's Estate even under the 
Appellee's theory of the case. It was not Estate income, Ms. 
Wood has not asked for Estate income, and Marge was not entitled 
to Estate income in addition to her living expenses. 
Finally, there is no evidence on the record that Grant's 
Estate gained any income during the time between Grant's death 
and Marge's death. Marge's estate, therefore, is not entitled to 




THIS COURT'S OPINION CREATES PROBLEMATIC PRECEDENT 
From a pragmatic standpoint, the Opinion creates dangerous 
precedent and makes a destructive inroad into the sanctity and 
security of testamentary instructions. This Opinion will no 
doubt be cited in the future to excuse inappropriate behavior by 
personal representatives or trustees who wish to substitute their 
own desires for those of the testator. Marge's breach of duty, 
carried to a logical extreme, could have been far more damaging 
to Grant's Estate and still have been excused under this Opinion. 
If, for example, she had been younger and in better health at the 
time Grant died, she could have left her money untouched, which 
she did, and she could have spent all of Grant's Estate on 
travel, entertainment, and luxury purposes. Based on the record, 
the couple lived lavishly, and she could justify these 
expenditures of Grant's money as ''maintain [ing] her in the 
standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's] lifetime," 
as instructed by the Will. Under this Court's Opinion, that 
behavior would be perfectly acceptable, regardless of the fact 
that the Trust had never been formed, the co-trustees had never 
been appointed, Grant's beneficiaries would be left with nothing, 
and Marge's estate, left untouched, would have grown larger by 
the day. Such a scenario is obviously unfair, but it is a 
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foreseeable possibility in the future under this Opinion. This 
Court should, therefore, vacate the Opinion and remand the matter 
to the Trial Court for further factual determinations, rather 
than create such a judicial escape hatch for complete disregard 
for testamentary fiduciary duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests 
that this Court grant a rehearing of his appeal, and after 
reconsideration of the matter, remand it to the Trial Court for 
factual determination. 
DATED thi s_j£) day of May, 1996. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN/3 MART/NEAU 
'im R. Wilson 
David L. Pinkston 
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